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: : The report covers : : - The Role & Function of Political Control Technologies : : - Recent Trends and Innovations : : - Developments in Surveillance Technologies : : - Innovations in Crowd Control Weapons : : - New Prison Control Systems : : - Interrogation, Torture Techniques and Technologies : : - Regulation of Horizontal Proliferation : : - Further Research : : ------------ BEGIN QUOTED TEXT ------------------ : : AN APPRAISAL OF TECHNOLOGIES OF POLITICAL CONTROL : : Scientific and Technological Options Assessment : : : : STOA : : Working Document (Consultation version) : : PE 166 499 : : : : Luxembourg, 6 January 1998 : : [...] : : Editor: Mr. Dick Holdsworth : : This is a working document. The current version is being circulated : : for consultation. It is not an official publication of STOA or of the : : European Parliament. : : This document does not necessarily represent the views of the : : European Parliament. : : [...] : : 4.4 National & International Communications : : Interceptions Networks : : Modern communications systems are virtually : : transparent to the advanced interceptions : : equipment which can be used to listen in. : : Some systems even lend themselves to a dual : : role as a national interceptions network. : : For example the message switching system : : used on digital exchanges like System X in : : the UK supports an Integrated Services : : Digital Network (ISDN) Protocol. This : : allows digital devices, e.g. fax to share : : the system with existing lines. The ISDN : : subset is defined in their documents as : : "Signalling CCITT1-series interface for : : ISDN access". What is not widely known is : : that built in to the international CCITT : : protocol is the ability to take phones 'off : : hook' and listen into conversations : : occurring near the phone, without the user : : being aware that it is happening. (SGR : : Newsletter, No.4, 1993) This effectively : : means that a national dial up telephone : : tapping capacity is built into these : : systems from the start. (System X has been : : exported to Russia & China) Similarly, the : : digital technology required to pinpoint : : mobile phone users for incoming calls, : : means that all mobile phone users in a : : country when activated, are mini-tracking : : devices, giving their owners whereabouts at : : any time and stored in the company's : : computer for up to two years. Coupled with : : System X technology, this is a custom built : : mobile track, tail and tap system par : : excellence. (Sunday Telegraph, 2.2.97). : : Within Europe, all email, telephone and fax : : communications are routinely intercepted by : : the United States National Security Agency, : : transferring all target information from : : the European mainland via the strategic hub : : of London then by satellite to Fort Meade : : in Maryland via the crucial hub at Menwith : : Hill in the North York Moors of the UK. The : : system was first uncovered in the 1970's by : : a group of researchers in the UK (Campbell, : : 1981). The researchers used open sources : : but were subsequently arrested under : : Britain's Official Secrets legislation. The : : 'ABC' trial that followed was a critical : : turning point in researcher's understanding : : both of the technology of political control : : and how it might be challenged by research : : on open sources.(See Aubrey, 1981 & Hooper : : 1987) Other work on what is now known as : : signals intelligence was undertaken by : : researchers such as James Bamford, which : : uncovered a billion dollar world wide : : interceptions network, which he nicknamed : : 'Puzzle Palace'. A recent work by Nicky : : Hager, Secret Power, (Hager,1996) provides : : the most comprehensive details to date of a : : project known as ECHELON. Hager interviewed : : more than 50 people concerned with : : intelligence to document a global : : surveillance system that stretches around : : the world to form a targeting system on all : : of the key Intelsat satellites used to : : convey most of the world's satellite phone : : calls, Internet, email, faxes and telexes. : : These sites are based at Sugar Grove and : : Yakima, in the USA, at Waihopai in New : : Zealand, at Geraldton in Australia, Hong : : Kong, and Morwenstow in the UK. : : The ECHELON system forms part of the UKUSA : : system but unlike many of the electronic : : spy systems developed during the cold war, : : ECHELON is designed for primarily non- : : military targets: governments, : : organisations and businesses in virtually : : every country. The ECHELON system works by : : indiscriminately intercepting very large : : quantities of communications and then : : siphoning out what is valuable using : : artificial intelligence aids like Memex to : : find key words. Five nations share the : : results with the US as the senior partner : : under the UKUSA agreement of 1948. Britain, : : Canada, New Zealand and Australia are very : : much acting as subordinate information : : servicers. Each of the five centres supply : : "dictionaries" to the other four of : : keywords, phrases, people and places to : : "tag" and the tagged intercept is forwarded : : straight to the requesting country. Whilst : : there is much information gathered about : : potential terrorists, there is a lot of : : economic intelligence, notably intensive : : monitoring of all the countries : : participating in the GATT negotiations. But : : Hager found that by far the main priorities : : of this system continued to be military and : : political intelligence applicable to their : : wider interests. Hager quotes from a : : "highly placed intelligence operatives" who : : spoke to the Observer in London. "We feel : : we can no longer remain silent regarding : : that which we regard to be gross : : malpractice and negligence within the : : establishment in which we operate." They : : gave as examples GCHQ interception of : : three charities, including Amnesty : : International and Christian Aid. "At any : : time GCHQ is able to home in on their : : communications for a routine target : : request," the GCHQ source said. In the case : : of phone taps the procedure is known as : : Mantis. With telexes its called Mayfly. By : : keying in a code relating to third world : : aid, the source was able to demonstrate : : telex "fixes" on the three organisations. : : With no system of accountability, it is : : difficult to discover what criteria : : determine who is not a target. : : In February, The UK-based research : : publication Statewatch reported that the EU : : had secretly agreed to set up an : : international telephone tapping network via : : a secret network of committees established : : under the "third pillar" of the Mastricht : : Treaty covering co-operation on law and : : order. Key points of the plan are outlined : : in a memorandum of understanding, signed by : : EU states in 1995.(ENFOPOL 112 10037/95 : : 25.10.95) which remains classified. : : According to a Guardian report (25.2.97) it : : reflects concern among European : : Intelligence agencies that modern : : technology will prevent them from tapping : : private communications. "EU countries it : : says, should agree on "international : : interception standards set at a level that : : would ensure encoding or scrambled words : : can be broken down by government agencies." : : Official reports say that the EU : : governments agreed to co-operate closely : : with the FBI in Washington. Yet earlier : : minutes of these meetings suggest that the : : original initiative came from Washington. : : According to Statewatch, network and : : service providers in the EU will be obliged : : to install "tappable" systems and to place : : under surveillance any person or group when : : served with an interception order. These : : plans have never been referred to any : : European government for scrutiny, nor one : : suspects to the Civil Liberties Committee : : of the European Parliament, despite the : : clear civil liberties issues raised by such : : an unaccountable system. We are told that : : the USA, Australia, Canada, Norway and Hong : : Kong are ready to sign up. All these but : : Norway are parties to the ECHELON system : : and it is impossible to determine if there : : are not other agendas at work here. Nothing : : is said about finance of this system but a : : report produced by the German government : : estimates that the mobile phone part of the : : package alone will cost 4 billion D-marks. : : Statewatch concludes that "It is the : : interface of the ECHELON system and its : : potential development on phone calls : : combined with the standardisation of : : "tappable communications centres and : : equipment being sponsored by the EU and the : : USA which presents a truly global threat : : over which there are no legal or democratic : : controls."(Press release 25.2.97) : : Clearly, there needs to be a wide ranging : : debate on the significance of these : : proposals before further any further : : political or financial commitments are : : made. The following recommendations have : : that objective in mind. : : : : 4. RECOMMENDATIONS : : (i) All surveillance technologies, : : operations and practices should be subject : : to procedures to ensure democratic : : accountability and there should be proper : : codes of practice to ensure redress if : : malpractice or abuse takes place. Explicit : : criteria should be agreed for deciding who : : should be targeted for surveillance and who : : should not, how such data is stored, : : processed and shared. Such criteria and : : associated codes of practice should be made : : publicity available. : : (ii) All requisite codes of practice should : : ensure that new surveillance technologies : : are brought within the appropriate data : : protection legislation. : : (iii) Given that data from most digital : : monitoring systems can be seemlessly : : edited, new guidance should be provided on : : what constitutes admissible evidence. This : : concern is particularly relevant to : : automatic identification systems which will : : need to take cognisance of the provisions : : of Article 15, of the 1995 European : : Directive on the Protection of Individuals : : and Processing of Personal Data. : : (iv) Regulations should be developed : : covering the provision of electronic : : bugging and tapping devices to private : : citizens and companies, so that their sale : : is governed by legal permission rather than : : self-regulation. : : (v) Use of telephone interception by Member : : states should be subject to procedures of : : public accountability referred to in (i) : : above. Before any telephone interception : : takes place a warrant should be obtained in : : a manner prescribed by the relevant : : parliament. In most cases, law enforcement : : agencies will not be permitted to self- : : authorise interception except in the most : : unusual of circumstances which should be : : reported back to the authorising authority : : at the earliest opportunity. : : (vi) Annual statistics on interception : : should be reported to each member states' : : parliament. These statistics should provide : : comprehensive details of the actual number : : of communication devices intercepted and : : data should be not be aggregated. (This is : : to avoid the statistics only identifying : : the number of warrants, issued whereas : : organisations under surveillance may have : : many hundreds of members, all of whose : : phones may be subject to interception). : : (vii) Technologies facilitating the : : automatic profiling and pattern analysis of : : telephone calls to establish friendship and : : contact networks should be subject to the : : same legal requirements as those for : : telephone interception and reported to the : : relevant member state parliament. : : (viii) The European Parliament should : : reject proposals from the United States for : : making private messages via the global : : communications network (Internet) : : accessible to US Intelligence Agencies. Nor : : should the Parliament agree to new : : expensive encryption controls without a : : wide ranging debate within the EU on the : : implications of such measures. These : : encompass the civil and human rights of : : European citizens and the commercial rights : : of companies to operate within the law, : : without unwarranted surveillance by : : intelligence agencies operating in : : conjunction with multinational competitors. : : (ix) The Committee should commission a more : : detailed report on the constitutional : : issues raised by the National Security : : Agency (NSA) facility to intercept all : : European telecommunications and the impact : : this supervisory capacity has on a) any : : existing constitutional safeguards protecting : : individuals or organisations from invasion : : of privacy such as those extant for example : : in Germany, b) the political, cultural and : : economic autonomy of European member : : states. This report should also cover the : : social and political implications of the : : EU/FBI proposals made to operate a global : : telecommunications surveillance network as : : discussed above. This report should also : : analyse the financial and constitutional : : implications of the proposals and provide : : an update of the work undertaken so far and : : the status of political approval. : : (x) Relevant committees of the European : : Parliament considering proposals for : : technologies which have civil liberties : : implications, for example the : : Telecommunications Committee in regard to : : surveillance, should be required to forward : : all relevant policy proposals and reports : : to the Civil Liberties Committee for their : : observations in advance of any political or : : financial decisions on deployment being : : taken.

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